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Towards an Asia-3DFLILFµ'HSRSXODWLRQ'LYLGHQG¶LQWKHst Century 
Regional Growth and Shrinkage in Japan and New Zealand 
 
 
Peter Matanle 
 
Abstract 
Japan is shrinking. Current projections indicate a population 
decrease of around one quarter by mid-century. 
Depopulation is potentially good news, providing 
opportunities for reconfiguring living conditions and 
alleviating human-environmental pressures. Nevertheless, 
ageing and depopulation have outcomes that require 
adjustment. One of these is spatial inequalities, which have 
been accelerating since the 1990s. Japan is the Asia-Pacific ?s 
pioneer ageing and shrinking society. In East Asia both China 
and South Korea are ageing and expected to begin shrinking 
soon. Even high immigration Anglophone countries such as 
New Zealand are experiencing post-growth demographic 
processes at subnational level. :ĂƉĂŶ ?ƐƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞ is in how 
adaptive responses there inform prospects for others as 
they experience their own post-growth pathways. This 
article presents case studies of Sado Island in Japan and New 
ĞĂůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ^ŽƵƚŚ/ƐůĂŶĚ in a comparative qualitative analysis 
of rural agency under population decline. Overall, I contend 
there is potential for benefitting from demographic 
shrinkage  W what I ƚĞƌŵĂ ‘ĚĞƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶĚŝǀŝĚĞŶĚ ? W and for 
rural regions in the Asia-Pacific to progress towards a 
sustainable post-growth economy and society. 
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Introduction 
Japan is shrinking. Government projections indicate that 
under current trends ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ may 
decrease by one quarter, from 128 million people in 2010 to 
under 100 million by 2050 (NIPSSR 2012) 1 , due to a 
sustained fall in rates of human reproduction in the postwar 
era. In combination with increasing life expectancy, Japan is 
therefore one of the most rapidly ageing countries in the 
world. With 27.4% of the population aged 65 or over, Japan 
ŝƐ Ă  ‘ŚǇƉĞƌ-ĂŐĞĚ ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐ ŽĨ ĂŐĞŝŶŐ
and depopulation are appearing across the entire Japanese 
archipelago (Coulmas 2007: 5; MIC 2017a). 
Population reduction is potentially good news, 
providing opportunities for alleviating human-
environmental pressures, reconfiguring the built 
environment, and improving lifestyles (Butler 2015; Conly 
2016). Nevertheless, ageing and depopulation have 
outcomes that require adjustment for affected countries, 
regions and sectors. One of these is spatial inequalities, on 
a national scale between provincial and metropolitan 
regions, and regionally between rural and urban locales. 
Rural-urban inequalities have been present in Japan since at 
least the early 20th century, but have become more acute 
since the 1990s, when the onset of economic stagnation 
coincided with the unwinding of the demographic tempo 
effects of the postwar baby boom and the long period of 
below replacement fertility. For example, the proportion of 
the population of working age has been declining since 
reaching its peak of 70% in 1990. By 2017 it had fallen to 
60.2%, and may reach an anticipated 51% in 2060 (MIC 
2015; 2017a), presenting challenges for the government in 
achieving fiscal stability and adequate care of older people. 
This is a pressing concern for rural regions, whose economic 
development and capital accumulation have lagged urban 
areas, but where the proportion of older residents needing 
interventions is larger. These and other issues exemplify a 
fissure developing between rural and urban regions, which 
looks set to deepen and widen. 
tŚĂƚ ŝƐ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĂďŽƵƚ :ĂƉĂŶ ?Ɛ ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ŝƐŚow 
adaptive responses there might inform prospects for other 
Asia-Pacific countries experiencing their own post-growth 
ƉĂƚŚǁĂǇƐ ? :ƵƐƚ ĂƐ :ĂƉĂŶ ?Ɛ  ? ?th century developmental 
leadership in Asia has long been acknowledged by scholars 
(See: Akamatsu 1962; Chang 2006), and occasionally by 
political leaders 2  (Vogel 2011), in the 21st century Japan 
might be seen as the pioneer ageing and shrinking society 
for trends that are becoming increasingly common on an 
Asia-Pacific and even global scale (Jackson 2014; Kaneko 
and Sato 2013; Matanle 2014; Matsutani 2006), with rural-
urban imbalances and inequalities being key indicators of 
national stability. 
This article develops a previously published book 
chapter on the dynamics of rural depopulation in Japan 
(Matanle 2017), and broadens its geographical reach and 
significance with the inclusion of research from New 
Zealand. Edited by David Chiavacci and Carola Hommerich 
(2017), Social Inequality in Post-Growth Japan: 
Transformation during Economic and Demographic 
Stagnation focuses on new forms of inequality emerging in 
Japan since the 1990s. Among three chapters that focus on 
rural-urban inequalities  W the other two by Lützeler (2017) 
and Elis (2017)  W my chapter presents a qualitative analysis 
of the means by which some rural residents in Japan are 
exercising agency in response to deepening and widening 
spatial gaps. The inclusion of research from New Zealand is 
intended to strengthen the contention that demographic 
and spatial imbalances are being experienced across the 
Asia-Pacific region, in countries with different 
circumstances and stages of development. Consequently it 
reinforces the broader argument underlying this research, 
by suggesting that agency as a response to ageing and 
ĚĞƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ :ĂƉĂŶ ?Ɛ ƌƵƌĂů ƌĞŐŝŽŶƐ can deliver 
positive spill-over effects, with the rural experience being 
useful in assisting urban areas in their transition to 
shrinkage, and in contributing to an emerging post-growth 
and post-developmental relationship among Asia-Pacific 
neighbours. 
The article begins by setting Japan and New 
Zealand within the world demographic context. With an 
emphasis on Japan, I will then describe some of the 
ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĂŐĞŝŶŐĂŶĚĚĞƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶŝŶďŽƚŚĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ?
rural regions, and use case studies of Sado Island in Niigata 
WƌĞĨĞĐƚƵƌĞĂŶĚEĞǁĞĂůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ^ŽƵƚŚ/ƐůĂŶĚƚŽŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞůŽĐĂů
responses. In addition, the article contains illustrations in 
the form of maps and photographs taken during research 
visits to Japan and New Zealand, as well as interactive 
elements, so that readers may explore growing and 
shrinking regions of Japan and New Zealand independently. 
Clicking on highlighted photo title text will reveal Google 
Maps and Streetmaps tools for the places featured in the 
photographs. 
Overall, I contend that there is potential for 
benefitting from demographic shrinkage  W what I term a 
 ‘ĚĞƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶĚŝǀŝĚĞŶĚ ? ?ĂŶĚ ĨŽƌ ƌƵƌĂů ƌĞŐŝŽŶƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞƐŝĂ-
Pacific to establish a sustainable post-growth economy and 
society. I define the depopulation dividend as the 
achievement from depopulation of positive gains that 
contribute to socio-cultural, political-economic, and 
environmentally sustainable living. 
 
Japan and New Zealand in the World Demographic Context 
In the 21st century a historic turnaround in world population 
trends is underway (Lutz, Sanderson and Scherbov 2001; 
Rostow 1998). Demographic transition theory predicts a 
convergence on below replacement fertility (Wilson 2011), 
whereby high-income countries with lower fertility levels 
(19.1% of current world population) will probably undergo 
depopulation, and middle-income countries (72.2% of world 
population) with intermediate fertility levels may 
experience shrinkage on reaching high-income status. The 
remaining 8.7% from low-income countries will either 
continue with high fertility or develop into intermediate or 
lower fertility regions (UNPD 2015). 
In East Asia, South Korea and China are at the tail 
ĞŶĚŽĨĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌ ‘ĚĞŵŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĚŝǀŝĚĞŶĚ ? ?ůŽŽŵet 
al 2003), whereby rapid demographic and economic 
expansion have gone hand in hand to deliver significant 
improvements in material well-being.3 Other countries in 
East and Southeast Asia are experiencing similar 
developmental pathways. Indeed, the successful economic 
and demographic transformation of East Asia is 
undoubtedly a seminal achievement in human history, and 
:ĂƉĂŶ ?ƐƐƉĞĂƌŚĞĂĚĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶŝŶŚĞůƉŝŶŐƚŽŐĂůǀĂŶŝǌĞŽƚŚĞƌ
ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ? ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĂů ƌĞŐŝŵĞƐ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ŶŽƚ ďĞ
underestimated. However, East Asia is ageing too, and 
about to begin shrinking. Once more Japan is leading the 
way. In fact the demographic transition to low fertility, 
ageing, and eventually depopulation is global  W though not 
universal  W with many countries experiencing variations of 
this post-growth developmental pathway. While Japan is in 
the vanguard in East Asia, even in Oceania among younger 
Anglophone countries with traditionally higher rates of 
immigration, both Australia and New Zealand are 
experiencing aspects of this transition, with lower fertility, 
ageing, and subnational depopulation processes underway 
(Jackson and Felmingham 2002; Jackson 2014). 
 Viewed negatively, ageing and depopulation could 
be considered a demographic burden, creating a series of 
systemic crises across the area, including higher levels of 
socio-economic inequality between growing and shrinking 
regions, whereby the winners from responses to changing 
socio-economic and population structures draw further 
away from the losers. In these circumstances it is also worth 
considering how these phenomena affect collective notions 
of social, cultural and political solidarity within nations that, 
even today, consider themselves to be relatively 
homogeneous and cohesive. Issues of rural-urban inequality 
are, therefore, deeply interwoven with socio-economic 
development and, moreoveƌ ?ƌĞƐŽŶĂƚĞǁŝƚŚƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŽǀĞƌĂůů
sense of identity and connectedness. 
 Figure 1 uses UN Population Division data 4  to 
display actual and projected demographic change in Japan, 
China, and South Korea, showing similar population 
development pathways through rapid growth in the 20th 
century, and transitioning into post-growth shrinking 
societies in the 21st. Moreover, projections for the 
dependency ratio between working and non-working age 
cohorts in East Asia (Figure 2) point to challenging 
circumstances for the continuation of growth-oriented 
economic regimes into the future. The graphs show that 
1990-95 was a turning point for Japan, as it marks the end 
of its demographic dividend, when the proportion of 
working age people reached its peak. It was also the 
moment that the economy made the transition to a lower 
growth regime. Thereafter the dependency ratio has risen 
and is expected to reach parity between working age and 
non-working age populations by 2040. China reaches its 
peak ratio in 2015-20 and South Korea in 2020-25, 
whereupon both are expected to follow Japan and 
experience greater pressures in maintaining contributions 
from working people to support growing numbers of older 
people, with South Korea reaching parity between working 
age and non-working age populations around 2050 and 
China around 2060. Importantly for overall world 
development, both Japan and South Korea achieved high 
income status before the onset of ageing and depopulation, 
while China is currently ageing and will likely experience 
depopulation as a developing middle-income country. 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1. Actual & Projected Population Change in East Asia 1950-2100 (millions. Japan and South Korea left 
hand scale, China right hand scale). 
 
 
Source: UNPD (2015). Note: Medium variant projections and variable fertility. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Actual and projected child and old age dependency ratio in East Asia (per cent). 
 
 
Source: UNPD (2015). Note: Dependents are persons 0-19 & 65+. 
 
 dŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ǁŝƚŚ ŽǀĞƌĂůů ĐŚĂŶŐĞƐ ŝŶ :ĂƉĂŶ ?Ɛ ĂŐĞ
structure has occurred a shift in its spatial distribution, due 
to familiar processes of agricultural transformation, 
industrialization, and urbanization that accompany 
modern economic development (England 2005; Egglestone 
ĂŶĚdƵůũĂƉƵƌŬĂƌ ? ? ? ? ) ?tŚĞƌĞĂƐŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?A?ŽĨ:ĂƉĂŶ ?Ɛ
population lived in urban regions, by 2015 this had 
increased to 90.5% (UNPD 2015). Simultaneously the total 
population was initially also expanding rapidly. This 
ƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ Ă ŵĂƐƐŝǀĞ ĞǆƉĂŶƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ :ĂƉĂŶ ?Ɛ ŵĞƚƌŽƉŽůŝƚĂŶ
areas and core cities (Maps 1-3), as well as high levels of 
urban population density, requiring enormous investments 
in housing and infrastructure (Photos 1-3), and coinciding 
with rapid increases in per capita incomes. However, in the 
1990s and 2000s both demographic and economic growth 
stalled. With the onset of national-scale depopulation in 
2008, and with the crucial exception of Tokyo, nearly all 
settlements are now shrinking, including the majority of 
provincial core cities (Map 4). This has produced a gradual 
awakening in Japan since the 1990s that depopulation can 
no longer be ignored as an unfortunate rural expression of 
successful national economic development, but as a 
significant national problem confronting nearly all 
settlements (Matanle and Rausch et al 2011). 
Significantly, the unwinding of demographic 
tempo effects produced by the combination of increasing 
longevity and long-term low fertility has meant, first, that 
most urban populations have followed rural regions into an 
era of ageing and depopulation and, second, the rate of 
population loss in rural regions has continued, even 
accelerated in many areas since the 1990s, as an increasing 
proportion of the rural population reaches advanced old 
age and passes away (Map 4) (Matanle and Sato 2010). 
Consequently, while urban areas experienced enormous 
pressures in accommodating demand for housing, 
infrastructure, goods and services in the early postwar 
decades, ageing and shrinkage are now a concern in cities, 
and urban questions continue to be the focus of human 
geographers interested in Japanese spatial patterns. Less 
remarked, perhaps because it is less frequently noticed, 
have been the stresses that population ageing and loss 
place on rural regions. 
ĞƐƉŝƚĞ ĞǀĞƌǇ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ ũŽƵƌŶĞǇ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ
development being an outcome of its own circumstances, 
distinct patterns of demographic change are evident in East 
Asia, as well as among other groups of Asia-Pacific 
countries, such as Anglophone Australia and New Zealand. 
Notable throughout the region, for example, has been the 
appearance of extreme differences in rural-urban 
population size and density. Huge urban metropolises have 
emerged, supplied with sophisticated high cost 
infrastructure to enable complex economies and diverse 
societies to function. These cities generate an enormous 
gravitational pull, drawing in people and resources from 
their suburban, periurban, and rural surroundings, as well 
as internationally. This accumulates into a widening gap 
between dynamic and prosperous metropolitan centres 
and declining and disconnected peripheries. In Japan the 
<ĂŶƚŽƌĞŐŝŽŶĐĂŶ ‘ďŽĂƐƚ ?ƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?ƐůĂƌŐĞƐƚƵƌďĂŶ
area by population.5 China possesses at least six megacities 
ŽĨŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶƚĞŶŵŝůůŝŽŶƉĞƌƐŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚĨŝǀĞŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?Ɛ
ten largest urban areas are located along the western arc 
of the Pacific Ocean  W in order of magnitude: Tokyo, Jakarta, 
Seoul, Manila, and Shanghai (Demographia 2016: 19). And 
Ăƚ ? ? ?ŵŝůůŝŽŶƉĞŽƉůĞƵĐŬůĂŶĚŚĂƐ ? ? ? ?A?ŽĨEĞǁĞĂůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ
population within its environs (SNZ 2013). 
 Projections for Australia and New Zealand indicate 
that both will grow steadily over the coming decades 
(Figure 3), presenting a different pattern at the national 
scale to East Asia. Nevertheless, this masks some 
subnational population dynamics whose outcomes are 
more redolent of the Japanese experience. First, both 
countries exhibit high rates of domestic rural-urban 
migration, producing strong urbanization trends, with 
89.4% of Australians and 86.3% of New Zealanders now 
living in urban areas (UNPD 2015). Second, although 
Australia and New Zealand receive higher levels of 
international migration in comparison with East Asia, 
patterns of settlement have changed. 21st century migrants 
increasingly are settling in metropolitan centres rather 
than provincial regions, and higher income individuals 
exhibit exceptionally mobile living patterns akin to being 
global nomads, frequently moving internationally between 
multiple domiciles. Third, New Zealand exhibits substantial 
population losses to out-migration, mostly of educated 
young adults to other Anglophone countries. Many return, 
but some do not; and at any one time approximately one-
ĨŝĨƚŚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ŽǀĞƌƐĞĂƐ
(Inkson and Thorn 2011). 
 Significantly, both Australia and New Zealand 
appear to exhibit some post-growth demographic trends, 
as yet less strongly than East Asian countriĞƐ ? ƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂ ?Ɛ
net reproduction rate, an earlier indication of underlying 
fertility trends than the total fertility rate, fell below the 
population replacement rate of 1.0 in 1975-80, as did New 
ĞĂůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ?- ? ? ? ƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂ ?Ɛ ƚŽƚĂů ĨĞƌƚŝůŝƚǇ ƌĂƚĞ
subsequently fell below 2.1 in 1975-80 and has hovered 
around 1.8-1.9 since then, while New Zealand has 
maintained a relatively higher level of 1.9-2.1 since 1980-
85 (UNPD 2015). Ageing is also deepening, from 10% of 
ďŽƚŚĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ?ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŝŶƚŚĞ  ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?ƚŚrough 15% in 
2015, and is projected to exceed 20% by 2030/35 (Jackson 
 ? ? ? ? ?hEW ? ? ? ? ) ?ŽƚŚĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ?ƚŽƚĂůĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐǇƌĂƚŝŽ
is therefore increasing (Figure 4), and their progression 
through the late 20th and early 21st centuries is similar  W 
though less steep  W to that of East Asia. 
 
Maps 1-4. Actual and projected population change in Japan by prefecture and prefectural capital city (1950-2030). Note. ArcGIS software used for all maps. 
 
  
  
 Photos 1-3. High density housing and sophisticated urban infrastructure in the Tokyo metropolis. (1) Housing in 
western Tokyo; (2) Tokyo Metropolitan Government building in West Shinjuku; (3) The Rainbow Bridge, Tokyo 
Bay. Click on highlighted text for Google Maps tools for these locations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo 4. Auckland, New Zealand, with port facilities in the foreground, and city centre in the background. 
 
 
 
 
 Fig. 3. Actual and projected population in Oceania 1950-2100 (millions. Australia left hand scale, New 
 Zealand right hand scale). 
 
 
Source: UNPD (2015). Note: Medium variant projections and variable fertility. 
 
 Fig. 4. Actual and projected child and old age dependency ratio in Oceania (per cent). 
 
 
Source: UNPD (2015). Note: Dependents are persons 0-19 & 65+. 
  
Theorising Regional Growth and Shrinkage in the 
Modern Era 
Theoretically speaking, while a national population is 
expanding it is probable, even an expectation, that the 
majority of communities will grow more or less 
continuously; and growth is still almost universally 
recognized as a positive and normative condition of 
modernity. Accordingly, population shrinkage and decline 
are considered aberrations requiring correction by the re-
establishment of growth. Despite this, there is little 
acknowledgement that growth, at least at rates commonly 
achieved in the 20th ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ?ŝƐĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐďƵƚ ‘ŶŽƌŵĂů ?ǁŚĞŶ
viewed from the perspective of the longue durée (Münz 
and Reiterer 2009). Furthermore, there remains as yet 
inadequate acknowledgment of possible alternatives to 
growth, of whether and for how long growth is sustainable, 
or of whether and under what circumstances shrinkage 
might be preferable. This is partly because nearly every 
country in the world is currently growing and examples of 
shrinkage at the national scale of a sufficient duration 
from which to draw valuable empirical lessons are few. 
 At the national scale demographic growth and 
shrinkage are easily definable with reference to statistics, 
and there is never a third outcome; at any particular time 
Ă ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ĞŝƚŚĞƌ ĞǆƉĂŶĚŝŶŐ Žƌ ƐŚƌŝŶŬŝŶŐ ?
Yet, when we examine population dynamics at the 
subnational level an intermediate stage becomes 
discernible. This is when the national population 
continues to expand due to demographic momentum 6, 
but fertility and internal migration indices have already 
dropped below replacement rates. This process becomes 
visible with the appearance and expansion of areas 
ƵŶĚĞƌŐŽŝŶŐĂ ‘ĚŽƵďůĞŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶĚŝƐĞƋƵŝůŝďƌŝƵŵ ? ?
revealing the potential for future national scale 
depopulation (Matanle and Sato 2010). 
 This situation started to become apparent in 
Japan from the late-1950s, when heavy rural-urban 
migration coincided with rapidly declining fertility. Maps 
5-8 display sub-regional population change in Niigata 
Prefecture, beginning in 1950, demonstrating that even as 
:ĂƉĂŶ ?ƐŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚƚŽŐƌŽǁƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŽ
2008, rural depopulation processes have been 
continuously present at many, particularly mountainous, 
ůŽĐĂůůĞǀĞůƐƐŝŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ?DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ:ĂƉĂŶ ?ƐƚŽƚĂů
fertility rate fell below the population replacement rate in 
1974, reaching 1.26 children per woman in 2005 and 
slowly climbing thereafter, the net reproduction rate fell 
below replacement as early as 1956 (MIC 2015). At the 
time this was considered a welcome and necessary 
counter-balance to the rapid expansion generated by the 
postwar baby boom. However, in these circumstances it is 
inevitable that, if conditions persisted, and in the absence 
of significant international migration, the number of 
deaths would eventually overtake the number of births 
and depopulation ensue. Conditions did persist and, sure 
enough, in 2008 the population of Japan began to decline. 
Under national-scale depopulation it is a 
mathematical certainty that population growth in one 
settlement is balanced by proportionally greater 
ƐŚƌŝŶŬĂŐĞ ŝŶ ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ? ŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ ? ĂƐ WůĂŶĞƚ ĂƌƚŚ ?Ɛ
largest settlement Tokyo continues to grow, drawing in 
people and resources from elsewhere, in a depopulating 
Japan nearly every other settlement is shrinking. Indeed, 
ƚŚĞ ĐĂƉŝƚĂů ƌĞŐŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ƐƚƌŽŶŐ ƵŶŝƉŽůĂƌ ĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŚĂƐ
even produced demographic destabilising effects in the 
Keihanshin urban region of Kyoto-Osaka-Kobe (Buhnik 
2014; 2017). In peripheral rural areas some communities 
are now collapsing and others are empty, leaving ghost 
towns and villages behind (Photos 5 and 6) (see, Grist 
2014). This is what Japanese social scientists mean when 
ƚŚĞǇ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞ  ‘genkai shƻƌĂŬƵ ? ? Žƌ  ‘ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ
ĞĚŐĞ ? ?KŶŽ ? ? ? ? ) ?ǁŚĞƌĞŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶŚĂůĨŽĨƚŚĞƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚƐ
are over 65 and the community unable to reproduce itself. 
In these places there is little economic activity, 
few children are being born, much of the built 
environment lies empty and deteriorating, and 
agricultural land is left for scrub. Forests encroach on 
residences, leaving villagers with less light and giving cover 
for animals such as monkeys, bears, deer, and boar to 
approach and raid allotments and orchards, ransack 
houses, and confront elderly residents (Knight 2003). 
According to the Rural Development Planning Commission, 
in 2005 there were 1,403 communities in imminent 
danger of collapse in Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu (NKKI 
2006: 33). In its most recent report on rural depopulation, 
published in February 2017, the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?ŽĨ:ĂƉĂŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ƐŚƻƌĂŬƵ) 
as having more than half of their population aged 65 or 
over, with the proportion being identified as such rising 
dramatically from 7.5% of settlements in 2001, to 15.5% 
in 2011 (10,091 settlements), and 22.1% of settlements in 
2016 (MIC 2011: 7-8; 2017b: 37). 7  Most striking of all, 
whereas in 2011 there were 205 settlements which had 
100% of their population over the age of 75, by 2016 this 
number had risen to 280, representing a rise of 36.6% in 
just five years (MIC 2011: 7-8; 2017b: 38). 
 One method for contributing to this emerging 
discussion is to compare processes and outcomes of 
demographic development in different areas of the world. 
For example, the experiences of Japan and New Zealand 
could be used as a basis for theorising the construction of 
a dimension of analysis for the Asia-Pacific area, with 
thresholds of demographic development placed along it. 
At one end lies Japan, the first Asia-Pacific country to pass 
over the transition to national scale depopulation, while 
New Zealand would be mid-way along, as a high income 
country potentially exhibiting early signs of a 21st century 
post-growth regime. Or we could model depopulation by 
gathering countries into groups according to similar 
geographies of development, with East Asia (Japan, South 
Korea,, China etc.) in one, and Anglophone Oceania 
(Australia, New Zealand etc.) in another. As a qualitative 
examinatiŽŶ ŽĨ ƚǁŽ ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ? ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ ? ƚŚŝƐ ĂƌƚŝĐůĞ
establishes a theoretical framework for comparing 
different scales and locales of depopulation in specific 
developmental contexts, and consequently moves 
towards a more systematic understanding of the regional 
dynamics of growth and shrinkage in the modern era. 
Accordingly, what are some of the conditions of 
ůŝǀŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ŝŶ :ĂƉĂŶ ?Ɛ ĂŶĚ EĞǁ ĞĂůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ ƌƵƌĂů
regions and what have been some of the responses to 
community decline, in particular since the post-growth era 
began in the 1990s? In the next section I present 
description and analysis from 25 years of personal 
experience of and research into rural depopulation and 
decline in Japan, focusing first on issues of employment 
and over-capacity in Niigata Prefecture and Sado Island 
(see, Matanle 2006; Matanle and Sato 2010), and then on 
ƌƵƌĂů ĂŐĞŶĐǇ ŝŶ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƌĞŐŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐ
circumstances. I will then supplement this with research 
conducted in 2015 and 2016 in New Zealand. 
 
Maps 5-8. Regional population change in Japan: Niigata Prefecture (1950-2030). Note: Pre-2004 municipal boundaries used for more detailed spatial definition of demographic 
change. 
 
  
  
 
Photos 5 and 6. (5) The main street in Hashima, abandoned in 1974; (6) Rows of empty houses in Horonai, Mikasa, 
Hokkaido. Click on highlighted text for Google Maps tools for these locations. 
 
 
 
ŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ KǀĞƌĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ŝŶ :ĂƉĂŶ ?Ɛ ^ŚƌŝŶŬŝŶŐ
Regions 
Despite stable employment being the foundation for a 
durable and resilient community, well-paid secure full-
time jobs are in short supply in rural Japan. Traditional 
routes into employment are disappearing where 
economic functions are in decline, services in 
reorganization and retreat, and government 
redistribution measures being cut back. For example, 
over-capacity in educational infrastructure due to a drop 
of approximately 50% nationwide in the number of school 
age children means that prefectural and municipal 
authorities are merging and closing schools, leading to 
fewer teaching opportunities. This culminates in empty 
school buildings dotting the landscape, reminding 
residents of once thriving communities alive with 
ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐƉůĂǇ ?WŚŽƚŽ ? ) ? 
 In multi-children households in the past the 
eldest son, or another of the children, would remain near 
to the family holding and take employment in public 
services or teaching, for example, to look after the family 
business, farm or property as his (or her) parents aged, 
and this would allow younger siblings to migrate to urban 
locales safe in the knowledge of household continuity 
(Matanle 2006). However, Japan is now a low fertility 
culture; meaning that the majority of adults of child-
bearing age were themselves born into a low fertility 
family as an only child or with perhaps one sibling. In a 
society where having one or perhaps two children is 
considered the norm, then a lack of long-term 
employment opportunities can have disastrous impacts 
on rural community reproduction. As economic 
opportunities have contracted, particularly since the 
1990s, younger people who have felt the need to move 
away to seek educational, employment and social 
opportunities in provincial cities or metropolitan regions, 
leave their parents alone and deprive the community of its 
reproductive potential. Few return. 
In these cases family businesses disappear, and 
leave residents  W predominantly older people  W 
dependent on a depleted community base. These 
households are often small-scale crafts manufacturers, 
niche food and beverage producers, local retailers, 
restaurants, guest houses and small hotels (Photo 8). Their 
closure causes secondary damage to economic potential, 
just as municipal authorities are seeking to boost the 
ůŽĐĂůĞ ?Ɛ ĂƚƚƌĂĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ƚŽ ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƌƐ ƚŽ ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶ
economic sustainability. Following is a statement by a 
teacher with responsibility for career education at a senior 
high school (ages 15-17), describing the employment 
ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĞƌĞĂŶĚǇŽƵŶŐĞƌƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĂƉƚŝƚƵĚĞƐ ? 
 
When they graduate most [students] leave and the 
number that return is small. Even if graduates want to 
return [to Sado], there are few places that can employ 
them because their skills and knowledge are not suited 
to the work here .... There are no big companies and 
manufacturing has almost disappeared, construction is 
scaling down, agriculture is more difficult ... managers 
tend to be from outside, while temps and part-timers 
are usually locals. Senior High School teacher and 
careers advisor, Niibo, Sado City, Niigata Prefecture. 
 
Similarly, as a result of central government 
measures aimed ostensibly at providing local autonomy 
through decentralization and rationalization, and partly 
with the intention of providing the tools to respond to 
ageing and depopulation in rural regions, a wave of 
municipal mergers took place through the early 2000s 
which saw the number of municipalities decrease by 45%, 
from 3,229 to 1,788 between 1999 and 2008 (Rausch 
2012: 187; Yokomichi 2007: 6-7). Niigata saw the greatest 
proportion of mergers of any prefecture, with the number 
of municipalities dropping 69%, from 112 to 35 (Yokomichi 
2007: 20). In 2004 Sado Island, which had lost nearly 50% 
of its 1950 population, went from ten municipalities to a 
single Sado City. 
Municipal mergers have driven an ongoing 
reorganization and centralization of essential services, 
resulting in the closure of public facilities and buildings in 
ƉĞƌŝƉŚĞƌĂů ĂƌĞĂƐ ? Ɛ ŽĨ ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ  ? ? ? ? :ĂƉĂŶ ?Ɛ ůŽĐĂů
governments planned to demolish 12,251 redundant 
municipal buildings at a projected cost of JPY404 billion, 
with none being scheduled for renovation or rebuilding, 
and only 40% of which were in use (NKS 03.12.2013). 
Moreover, as services have become more distant from 
users, and public transport cut back, residents feel forced 
into cars, which disproportionately affects older people, 
who often have mobility restrictions, but who may not 
drive. Hence, younger and middle-aged people then spend 
resources and time helping and caring for elderly relatives 
and neighbours in compensation for reduced formal 
service provision. Although such kindness is admirable, it 
reduces the opportunity that able citizens have for 
economic sustenance activity. Furthermore, as 
organizations close facilities, remove duplication, and slim 
workforces through retiree attrition, businesses located 
nearby such as restaurants and cafés lose customers, as 
indicated by the following quotation. 
 
The municipal merger has meant that there are fewer 
public officials working here, as jobs have been closed 
down or moved to the new city office. So, the bulk of 
our lunchtime business has now gone ... My husband's 
bar also gets fewer customers in the evening as public 
officials do their evening eating and drinking in the new 
restaurants in Sawata, which is closer to the city office. 
Café and restaurant owner, Aikawa, Sado City, Niigata 
Prefecture. 
 
The preference among urban Japanese for travel 
and tourism overseas means that tourism related 
employment is also declining in many domestic rural 
destinations, particularly for women seeking part-time or 
seasonal jobs to supplement family incomes and enable 
informal social care roles. Although international tourism 
to Japan is increasing, foreign visitors rarely venture 
beyond the most popular sites in Tokyo and Kyoto. In 
response to the decline in their populations and 
economies through the postwar period, many regional 
municipalities had attempted to revitalize their declining 
economies through the development of tourism facilities, 
which have since failed, leaving towns saddled with huge 
debts and a declining tax base. Indeed, for the purposes of 
tourism, many rural areas in Japan are considered remote 
marginal communities unworthy of a visit. 
Accordingly, overcapacity has recently become a 
serious concern in non-metropolitan regions, as 
communities shrink, leaving excess housing stock, 
underused infrastructure, and underworked land (Photos 
9-13). Provincial real estate markets are failing as houses 
remain empty and property reinvestment is falling, 
leading to shabby and derelict neighbourhoods, further 
depressing the atmosphere, reducing land values and 
encouraging out-migration by those who can  W leaving 
behind those who cannot! The prefectures with the most 
rapid depopulation also, not unexpectedly, have the 
lowest land prices; Tokyo (JPY309,700/m2) is more than 
20 times as expensive as Akita (JPY15,300/m2) (MLIT 
2014). Empty houses, or akiya, indeed entire 
neighborhoods, are becoming unsellable due to 
colonization by fauna and flora, and thousands of shops 
and businesses lie empty and deteriorating or are 
underused. Data from tŚĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ,ŽƵƐŝŶŐ
and Land Survey show 8.3 million vacant dwellings in 
Japan, up from 7.6 million in 2008 and 3.9 million in 1988, 
3.2 million of which (2.7 million in 2008 and 1.3 million in 
1988) were categorized as being left unattended or whose 
owners had died (MIC 2013; 2008). 
It is difficult to imagine that one could derive 
benefits and opportunities from such circumstances. In 
the next section, however, I will show that some people 
are attempting to do so, as a result of a gradually emerging 
change in personal orientation away from 20th century 
values that prioritize economic growth and demographic 
expansion, towards 21st century values that emphasize the 
achievement of personal and community wellbeing. 
,ĞƌĞ ?ƐŚŽǁ ? 
 
Photos 7-8. (7) An abandoned elementary school in Sotokaifu, Sado Island  ? since the photo was taken the school 
buildings have been taken down and a paved area is all that remains; (8) ŶĂďĂŶĚŽŶĞĚŚŽƚĞůŝŶdƃǇƃdŽǁŶ ?
Kochi Prefecture, at the time of the photo inhabited by squatters - hence the original flower beds being used as 
vegetable allotments. Click on highlighted text for Google Maps tools for these locations. 
 
 
 
 
Community Responses Under National-Scale 
Depopulation in Japan: (Re)Valuing Localism, 
Environment, and Lifestyle Aesthetics 
KƵƚƐŝĚĞ :ĂƉĂŶ ?Ɛ ŵĞƚƌŽƉŽůŝƚĂŶ ĐĞŶƚƌĞƐ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚ ŽĨ
community growth is now impossible for the majority of 
settlements, in the absence of an unlikely sudden or 
dramatic change in migration or fertility. Indeed, in 2015 
ageing and shrinkage were occurring in three quarters of 
:ĂƉĂŶ ?Ɛ ŵƵŶŝĐŝƉĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ? ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ŵĂŶǇ ƵƌďĂŶ ĂŶĚ
suburban locales, with this proportion predicted to rise to 
more than nine out of ten municipalities by 2030 (MIC 
2015; NIPSSR 2012). How are rural residents adjusting to 
the new dynamic of national-scale depopulation? In 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ?ĐĂŶƚŚĞĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐĞŽĨĂ ‘ĚĞƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶĚŝǀŝĚĞŶĚ ?
be observed; one that might provide some lessons for 
other Asia-Pacific countries about to encounter similar 
dynamics? In this section I focus on community and 
individual responses to rural depopulation and link these 
to changes in value orientations. For it is values which 
inform human motivation, which in turn feeds behaviour, 
and which together constitute part of a complex series of 
psychological and emotional dimensions that constitute 
 ‘ĂŐĞŶĐǇ ? ?'ŝĚĚĞŶƐ ? ? ? ? ) ? 
Throughout most of the postwar era government 
interventions into the rural-urban divide in Japan have 
been dominated by a complex system of financial 
transfers to boost investment in rural infrastructure. To a 
great extent these measures have failed, principally 
because they were as much rooted in co-dependent 
political and financial relationships  W ƚŚĞ ‘ŝƌŽŶ-ƚƌŝĂŶŐůĞ ?ŽĨ
the bureaucracy, business and politics and the 
 ‘ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶƐƚĂƚĞ ? ?&ĞůĚŚŽĨĨ ? ? ? ? ?DcCormack 2001)  W as 
they were intended to resolve regional imbalances. 
Indeed, these so-ĐĂůůĞĚ  ‘ƐƉĂƚŝĂů ĞƋƵĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ ?
may have made the situation worse, for example by 
incentivizing villages to exhibit the characteristics of a 
collapsing community ŝŶ ŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽ ƌĞĐĞŝǀĞ ƐƚĂƚĞ  ‘kaso ?
(depopulation) subsidies (Mizohata 2010). 
&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?:ĂƉĂŶ ?ƐĐĞŶƚƌĂůůǇŵĂŶĂŐĞĚƉŽƐƚǁĂƌ
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŚĂƐǁƌĞĂŬĞĚŚĂǀŽĐŽŶƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐŶĂƚƵƌĂů
environment (Kerr 2002; Matanle and Rausch et al 2011; 
McCormack 2001). The felling of original growth mixed-
leaf forests and replacement by cedar monoculture, the 
ĐŽŶĐƌĞƚŝŶŐŽĨǀŝƌƚƵĂůůǇĂůůŽĨ:ĂƉĂŶ ?ƐŵĂũŽƌƌŝǀĞƌƐĨŽƌĨůŽŽĚ
control, the construction of 102 commercial airports, 
3,076 dams, and 1.2 million kilometres of roads, and the 
ƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞŽĨ ‘ďƌŝĚŐĞƐƚŽŶŽǁŚĞƌĞ ? ? ‘ƚƵŶŶĞůƐǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĞǆŝƚƐ ? ?
ĂŶĚ ‘ƉŽƌƚƐǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƐŚŝƉƐ ?ŵƵƐƚďĞĨĂŵŝůŝĂƌƚŽĂŶǇŽŶĞǁŝƚŚ
ĂŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨ:ĂƉĂŶ ?Ɛ ? ?th century regional development 
(ICOLD 2014; Kerr 2002; McCormack 2001; MIC 2015; 
World Airport Database 2015). Yet, despite these decades 
of spending  W perhaps in part because of them  W :ĂƉĂŶ ?Ɛ
regional communities continue resolutely to shrink and 
deteriorate. 
Where official policies continue to promote the 
notion of revitalization as a synonym for growth, however 
vaguely that is defined, some residents of rural areas 
express frustration because they recognize that in 
circumstances of national-scale shrinkage these are 
unattainable goals for their communities. The response 
among some residents is to conflate socio-economic, 
cultural, and environmental decline, to ascribe these to 
:ĂƉĂŶ ?ƐƚŽƉ-down and urban-centred modernization, and 
to work towards a more balanced accommodation with 
their surroundings. Consequently, some are including or 
even prioritizing other values in their decision-making; 
their rationale being that, where growth is unattainable, 
and to maintain a hopeful outlook, it makes sense to place 
importance on values that can be realized. Of these, three 
orientations have been expressed, and these represent a 
turn towards the local or regional, environmental 
conservation, and lifestyle aesthetics. 
 ŶĞǁ ůŽĐĂůŝƐŵ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐ ŝŶ :ĂƉĂŶ ?Ɛ
provincial regions since the 1990s. This is expressed via 
endogenous small-scale activities for the purposes of 
rejuvenating community sustainability through, for 
example, cultural and social development, creating a 
comfortable and functional built environment, promotion 
of health and well-being, care and compassion for more 
vulnerable citizens, micro-energy generation, clean 
agriculture, bio-diversity conservation, and the 
development of a regional and local politics. Recently this 
movement was given powerful extra impetus after the 11 
March 2011 tsunami and nuclear crisis in 
dƃŚŽŬƵ ?&ƵŬƵƐŚŝŵĂ ? ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ƚŚĞ ĐĞŶƚƌĂů ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
regional policies were associated with contributing to the 
severity of the unfolding disasters (Feldhoff 2013; Matanle 
2011). 
These movements are specific to local contexts 
and are usually neither anti-Tokyo nor anti-growth, 
though scepticism is present among some as to whether 
the political, bureaucratic and business elites in Tokyo 
understand, and are therefore able to respond to, local 
concerns. Consequently, for example, on 5 June 2013 50 
municipalities representing 4.3 million people signed up to 
ƚŚĞ ŶĞǁůǇ ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ  ‘ƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ DƵŶŝĐŝƉĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ĨŽƌ
Improving Residents' Sense of Well-ĞŝŶŐ ? ?ŶŝĐŬŶĂŵĞĚƚŚĞ
 ‘,ĂƉƉŝŶĞƐƐ>ĞĂŐƵĞ ? ) ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞƉƵrposes of developing small 
scale local projects that promote personal well-being, 
sharing information between municipalities, and by-
passing the central government in Tokyo (ISHES 2013). 
Together with those who are raising social, 
political, and environmental concerns, many people in 
rural areas are preferencing lifestyle aesthetics. This can 
be seen in the number of lovingly restored houses and 
other buildings using locally sourced materials, and 
craftspeople using traditional methods. In some cases 
initiators have been long-term foreign residents who are 
disappointed with the aesthetics in postwar planning and 
architecture, or are seeking to contribute to community 
sustainability, and have begun with restoration of their 
own properties, which then galvanizes others nearby to do 
the same. Some of these properties serve as businesses 
and have become focal points for local cultural and socio-
economic revitalization efforts. While these can be 
ƉƌŽĨŝƚĂďůĞ ? ƚŚĞ ŽǁŶĞƌƐ ? ĨŽĐƵƐ ŚĂƐ ĂůƐŽ ďĞĞŶ ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů ?
social, and cultural (for example, Kerr 2013). 
In Sado Island in Niigata Prefecture examples of 
the above change in value orientations, and their 
behavioural manifestations, are numerous (Photos 14-18). 
They are to a great extent responses to what residents 
view as geographical, or regional, gaps (chiiki kakusa) that 
have been widening, particularly since the 1990s when 
Japan went into its long-term economic slowdown and the 
2000s, when the central government adopted a more 
stringent approach to supporting rural areas, such as with 
the Trinity Reforms enacted by Prime Minister Koizumi 
(Elis 2017). What is interesting about these developments 
is their concern with community restoration and cohesion, 
and not growth per se. They are anchored in local 
particularities and show concern for the past as well as the 
present and future. They acknowledge that growth is no 
longer possible and instead represent a turn towards local 
well-being. They are as much a consequence of the 
impacts of depopulation as they are about taking the 
opportunities that depopulation presents. It is important 
also to acknowledge that they are also derived from wider 
concerns, such as for climate change and biodiversity, and 
enable the people of Sado to reach out beyond traditional 
networks and political structures to appeal to a more 
global audience. Here are some examples. 
 
 
Photos 9- ? ? PďĂŶĚŽŶĞĚĂŶĚĞŵƉƚǇďƵŝůĚŝŶŐƐĂƌĞŶŽǁĂĐŽŵŵŽŶƐŝŐŚƚ ŝŶ:ĂƉĂŶ ?ƐƉƌŽǀŝŶĐŝĂůƌĞŐŝŽŶƐ ?  ? ? ?A row of empty shops in Shibata City, Niigata Prefecture; (10) A 
farmhouse with a tree growing outwards from the inside in TƃǇƃdŽǁŶ ?<ŽĐŚŝWƌĞĨĞĐƚƵƌĞ; (11) An office building and shops in Ueda City, Nagano Prefecture; (12) An abandoned 
farmhouse in ZǇƃƚƐƵ ?^ĂĚŽŝƚǇ ?EŝŝŐĂƚĂWƌĞĨĞĐƚƵƌĞ; (13) A former business in Aikawa, Sado City.  
 
  
  
 
 
  
Photos 14-18. (14) A hand-ƉĂŝŶƚĞĚƐŝŐŶŽŶĂƌŽĂĚƐŝĚĞŝŶ^ĂĚŽ ?dŚĞĐĂƉƚŝŽŶƌĞĂĚƐ ‘dŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞdŽŬŝŝŶƚŚĞƐŬǇŽŶĐĞŵŽƌĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?dĂŝŬŽǆĐŚĂŶŐĞ^ƚƵĚǇĞŶƚĞƌ ?ƚŚĞ<ŽĚŽƚĂŝŬŽĚƌƵŵŐƌŽƵƉ ?Ɛ
base in Ogi Town, southwestern Sado; (16) Saké produced exclusively by Hokusetsu of Akadomari in Sado for the Nobu international restaurant chain; (17) Original growth temperate 
rain forest in northeastern Sado; (18) The satoyama landscape near Aikawa, in Sado Island. Click on highlighted text for Google Maps tools for these locations. 
 
   
  
 
 Under Mayor Takano (2004-2012), Sado City 
launched a series of town hall hearing sessions to learn of 
ůŽĐĂů ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ ŵŽƌĞ ĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŽ ĞŶŐĂŐĞ ŝŶ
direct dialogue with citizens. The results have translated 
ŝŶƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŵĂǇŽƌ ?Ɛ ŐŽĂů ŽĨ ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ^ĂĚŽ ŝŶƚŽ Ă  ‘sumiyasui 
tokoro ? ?ŽƌĐŽŵĨŽƌƚĂďůĞůŝǀŝŶŐƐƉĂĐĞ ?ĨŽƌůŽĐĂůƉĞŽƉůĞ ?WĂƌƚ
of the development of a sumiyasui tokoro has been a 
ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ƚŽ ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚ ^ĂĚŽ ĂƐ ĂŶ  ‘ĞĐŽ-ŝƐůĂŶĚ ? ĂŶĚ ĂŶ
example for people elsewhere to live in greater harmony 
with their natural surroundings. This includes various 
initiatives, such as eco-tourism to the original growth 
temperate rain forest in northeastern Sado, and has 
centred on the conservation of the symbolic toki, or 
Japanese crested ibis (Nipponia nippon), whose only 
remaining habitat in Japan is Sado. For some the survival 
ŽĨƚŚĞ ŝƐůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇĂŶĚĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ŝƐĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
continued future residence of crested ibis such that, 
rather like the ravens at the Tower of London, the 
disappearance of the toki would presage the end of Sado 
as a human community. 
 The desire to nurture the toki and return it to 
sustainability in its habitat, after a long period of the 
systematic promotion of conventional modern industrial 
agricultural techniques, is expressive of a revival of 
traditional food production and consumption practices in 
Sado (FAO 2010). This is manifested in, for example, the 
conservation of the satoyama landscape and agricultural 
system, which is unique to Japan, but which has valuable 
lessons for Asia in preserving bio-diversity at the human-
forest interface under wet rice agriculture. This led to the 
award to Sado in 2011, in conjunction with the Noto 
Peninsula in Ishikawa Prefecture, of Globally Important 
Agricultural Heritage Status (GIAHS) by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO 2011). The award 
was notable because it was the first time any region in a 
developed country had been recognized for the 
importance of its agricultural heritage and the efforts of 
local people in conserving the natural environment for 
sustainable food production. Interestingly, the project 
joined multiple actors unused to working together in a 
coordinated effort going beyond traditional bureaucratic 
channels, including local, national and international 
organizations, academic and non-governmental 
institutions, and corporations (FAO 2010). 
 Sado City government is also participating with a 
regional private education provider to develop vocational 
education relevant to local needs and sensibilities. NSG 
has opened the first post-secondary institution to be 
located in Sado, which delivers courses in Environmental 
Management, Care and Welfare for the Elderly, and 
Traditional Crafts (including architectural restoration and 
 ‘DƵŵǇŽŝ ? ƉŽƚƚĞƌǇ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐ ƵŶŝƋƵĞ ƚŽ ^ĂĚŽ ) ?8  Students 
come from Sado as well as other parts of Japan to study in 
ŽŶĞŽĨ:ĂƉĂŶ ?Ɛ richest natural and cultural environments. 
KƉĞŶĞĚŝŶƉƌŝů ? ? ? ?ŽŶƚŚĞƐŝƚĞŽĨĂĨŽƌŵĞƌŐŝƌůƐ ?ƐĞŶŝŽƌ
high school, and with a JPY200 million loan from the 
municipality, NSG now teaches six courses in related 
subjects and accepts up to 200 students per year group. 
For graduating students there are opportunities to remain 
in Sado working to care for the elderly population, as well 
as work in the restoration of temples and shrines, and in 
ƌĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƐůĂŶĚ ?ƐĂƌƚƐĂŶĚĐƌĂĨƚƐŚĞƌŝƚĂŐĞ ?/ŶĂŶĞƌĂ
when more than 75% of each youth cohort now 
experiences post-secondary education this is a significant 
step for socio-cultural sustainability in Sado because, for 
the first time, younger people do not have to leave the 
island if they wish to continue their studies beyond upper 
secondary school. 
 Further examples of the municipal government 
and citizens of Sado reaching out beyond traditional 
networks to develop local social, environmental, and 
cultural resources, as well as contribute to those 
elsewhere, are: 
x The Small Island Study Association held its Fifth 
International Conference on Small Island 
Cultures in Sado in 2009. Sado municipal 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ŝŶǀŝƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ
conference to the island was to bolster efforts to 
ƌĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉ ƚŚĞ ŝƐůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ ĐƵůƚƵƌĂů ĂŶĚ
environmental resources, as well as to share 
^ĂĚŽ ?Ɛ ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ ĂŶĚ ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ǁŝƚŚ ƉĞŽƉůĞ
living in small islands across the world.9 
x Sado is the base for the world famous Kodo taiko 
drumming group, who tour internationally and 
host a summer percussion festival in Ogi Town, 
which draws thousands of visitors to Sado. 10 
Year-round the group contributes to music 
education and performance in Sado through its 
purpose-built centre in Ogi, southwestern Sado. 
x Sado hosts an international triathlon in 
September each year. Celebrating its 29th running 
in 2017, it attracts more than 1,200 athletes and 
sponsors from Japan and internationally. 11 It is 
one of only two long-distance triathlons in Japan, 
comparable in distance and difficulty to the Iron 
Man event in Hawaii. In 2018 it will be the 
representative event for Japan in the 
/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů dƌŝĂƚŚůŽŶ hŶŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ŐůŽďĂů ƐĐŚĞĚƵůĞ
for elite athletes. As the centrepiece event of the 
municipal Sado City Sports Association, it is part 
of an island-wide effort to promote health and 
well-being among citizens, to attract visitors and 
ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞůǇƚŽƚŚĞŝƐůĂŶĚ ?ƐŝŵĂŐĞ ?12 This 
includes everything from long distance cycling 
events and open water swimming, to exercise 
programmes for local people. 
x With the largest concentration of micro-
ďƌĞǁĞƌŝĞƐŽĨĂŶǇƉƌĞĨĞĐƚƵƌĞ ?EŝŝŐĂƚĂ ?ƐƌƵƌĂůĂƌĞĂƐ
are famous internationally for saké production. 
Due to declining domestic markets for traditional 
ƐĂŬĠ ?ƚǁŽŽĨ^ĂĚŽ ?ƐƌĞŵĂŝŶŝŶŐƐŝǆƉƌŽĚƵĐĞƌƐĂƌĞ
responding to rising international demand, with 
one winning prizes in international competitions, 
such as the International Wine Challenge in 
London and the US National Sake Appraisal, as 
well as supplying the First Class cabin of Air 
France, and another supplying the worldwide 
 ‘EŽďƵ ? ĐŚĂŝŶ ŽĨ ƌĞƐƚĂƵƌĂŶƚƐ ƉĂƌƚ-owned by the 
actor Robert de Niro. 13  A third brewer is 
producing organic sake by purchasing rice 
directly from employees, by-passing 
conventional distribution systems, thereby 
providing a second income for them and 
strengthening local economic and environmental 
resilience simultaneously.14 
x Due to its history as a haven for political, religious, 
and intellectual exiles, Sado has the highest 
concentration of traditional Noh theatres outside 
ŽĨ<ǇŽƚŽ ?ƉƉƌŽǆŝŵĂƚĞůǇŽŶĞƚŚŝƌĚŽĨĂůů :ĂƉĂŶ ?Ɛ
Noh stages are located there, many as parts of 
village Shrine buildings. Restoration of shrines as 
Noh sites is ongoing and developing a following 
among aficionados of Noh theatre in Japan, and 
ŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚ ĂƐ Ă ƉĂƌƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŝƐůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ ŐƌĂĚƵĂů
restoration of its place as a centre for JĂƉĂŶ ?ƐĂƌƚƐ
and crafts heritage. 
The next section examines rural development in 
ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ŽĨ ĚĞŵŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐ ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ŝŶ EĞǁ ĞĂůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ
South Island, before concluding with a summary analysis 
that compares both Japan and New Zealand as post-
growth Asia-Pacific societies. 
 
  
 
Photos 19-23. (19) The coal mine at Ohai, Southland; (20) Collapsed rugby posts in Ohai  ? a sign of community decline in rugby mad South Island; (21) An empty property in Macraes; (22) 
The abandoned gold mine in St Bathans, now a secluded freshwater lake and beach; (23) Abandoned and boarded shopping street in Mataura, Southland. Click on highlighted text for 
Google Maps tools for these locations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
'ƌŽǁƚŚĂŶĚ^ŚƌŝŶŬĂŐĞŝŶEĞǁĞĂůĂŶĚ ?ƐRegions 
Compared to Japan, and among Asia-Pacific countries with 
a higher level of human development, New Zealand has a 
small and steadily growing population of approximately 
4.76 million. 15  With a relatively high rate of fertility at 
around 1.9 children per woman and significant 
immigration, New Zealand will continue to grow for the 
ĨŽƌĞƐĞĞĂďůĞĨƵƚƵƌĞ ?&ŝŐƵƌĞ ? ) ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƐŝŵŝůĂƌƚŽdŽŬǇŽ ?Ɛ
geographical influence within Japan, in New Zealand there 
is a strong unipolar concentration around Auckland, which 
acĐŽƵŶƚĞĚ ĨŽƌ  ? ? ? ?A? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ
35.3% of its GDP in 2013 (Nel 2015). Wellington, 
Christchurch and Hamilton are also growing. 16  Taken 
ƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞƐĞĨŽƵƌĐŝƚŝĞƐŵĂŬĞƵƉ ? ? ? ?A?ŽĨEĞǁĞĂůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ
population and 70.5% of its economic output (Nel 2015). 
 ĞƐƉŝƚĞĂůůĞǆĐĞƉƚŽŶĞŽĨEĞǁĞĂůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ ? ?ƐƵď-
national regions experiencing economic and demographic 
expansion, it is at the sub-regional, or district, level where 
demographic imbalances and economic inequalities are 
becoming discernible (Jackson 2014; Nel 2015; SNZ 2017). 
Among 983 statistical area units, 343 (34.9%) experienced 
depopulation between 2006 and 2013  W meaning that 
approximately one third of New Zealand is shrinking (Nel 
 ? ? ? ? ) ?tŝƚŚƌĂƉŝĚƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶŐƌŽǁƚŚŝŶƚŚĞEŽƌƚŚ/ƐůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ
urban centres, the outcome is decline and shrinkage 
among communities in the rural periphery (Photos 19-23), 
ƉƌŽŵƉƚŝŶŐ ƐŽŵĞ ĚĞŵŽŐƌĂƉŚĞƌƐ ƚŽ ŚĞƌĂůĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĞŶĚ ŽĨ
ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶŐƌŽǁƚŚ ?ĨŽƌEĞǁĞĂůĂŶĚ ?:ĂĐŬƐŽŶ ? ? ? ? P ? ) ?/Ŷ
the light of the evidence and analysis above on Japan, how 
are rural New Zealanders responding in their locales? 
 The Japanese experience shows that ageing and 
depopulation are intimately bound with broader 
disruptions occurring among and within communities, and 
this conclusion is mirrored in New Zealand. In recent 
decades provincial communities in New Zealand have 
been buffeted by the winds of globalization; not least 
because, since 1984, the government has embraced neo-
liberal economic and administrative reform (Boston and 
Eichbaum 2014; Nel and Stevenson 2014). Among the 
signature policies have been deregulation of economic 
functions, the ending of industrial and agricultural 
subsidies, and the implementation of a free trade regime. 
Like Japan, in New Zealand we can observe human-
environmental values being expressed through activities 
that do not prioritize growth. At the same time, New 
ĞĂůĂŶĚ ?ƐĚĞŵŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶŝƐĂƐǇĞƚůĞƐƐƐĞǀĞƌĞƚŚĂŶ
:ĂƉĂŶ ?Ɛ ? dŚĞ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ĂƐ Ă ǁŚŽůĞ ŝƐ Ɛƚŝůů ŐƌŽǁŝŶŐ ? ĂŶĚ
government policy has compelled regional and local actors 
to be more economically competitive and self-reliant than 
is perhaps the case in Japan, where centrally controlled 
spatial redistribution of taxation continues. Consequently, 
opportunities for growth are more numerous and realistic 
than for most Japanese communities. 
 One of the most pernicious outcomes of the 
confluence of ageing and depopulation on the one hand 
and globalization and deregulation on the other is that 
EĞǁ ĞĂůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ ƵƌďĂŶ-rural inequalities have widened 
(Rashbrooke (ed.) 2013). As in Japan (Matanle and Rausch 
et al 2011), a recursive downward spiralling of socio-
economic decline and demographic shrinkage has resulted 
in some areas. Thus, while Auckland, Wellington, Hamilton 
and Christchurch are able to maintain steady long-term 
growth in domestic and international investment and by 
attracting domestic and international migrants, there is a 
divergence development experiences among New 
ĞĂůĂŶĚ ?ƐƉƌŽǀŝŶĐŝĂů ƚŽǁŶƐĂŶĚ ƌƵƌĂů ƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?dŚŝƐ ŝƐ
particularly so in South Island, where some towns and 
regions have reaped considerable economic gains and 
expanded, while others have declined to the point where, 
in a small number of cases, local authorities have reduced 
or shut down essential services, such as schools and road 
maintenance, and are conƚĞŵƉůĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ  ‘ĐůŽƐƵƌĞ ?ŽĨƚŚĞ
community itself. Kearns et al (2010) refer to these 
ĐŚĂŶŐĞƐĂƐ ‘ďƌĞĂĐŚĞƐŝŶƚŚĞĨĂďƌŝĐŽĨƐŽĐŝĂůǁĞůĨĂƌĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ
can themselves tip a community into a precipitous and 
irreversible decline. 
 Both Japan and New Zealand are seeing the 
decline, and in some cases disappearance, of towns 
associated with traditional extractive industries. Well 
known in Japan are Hashima (Photo 5), an island in 
Nagasaki Bay based entirely on coal mining, which 
declined in the 1960s, was abandoned in 1974, and is now 
celebrated as an industrial heritage site and ruin 
 ?dĂŬĂǌĂŶĞ  ? ? ? ? ) ? ĂŶĚ zƻďĂƌŝ ŝŶ ,ŽŬŬĂŝĚŽ ? ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ĐŽĂů
mining town which lost around 90% of its population in 
the wake of a disastrous attempt to develop film tourism 
(Culter 1999; Seaton 2 ? ? ? ) ? EĞǁ ĞĂůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ ^ŽƵƚŚ /ƐůĂŶĚ
has also seen declines. For example, St Bathans and 
Macraes, both gold mining settlements in Otago, have all 
ďƵƚ ĚŝƐĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚ ? ƚŚŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ůĂƚƚĞƌ ?Ɛ ŐŽůĚ ŵŝŶĞ Ɛƚŝůů
produces. Ohai and Nightcaps, coal mining towns in 
Southland, are both shrinking due to uncertainty over the 
future of the mine at Ohai (Photos 19-23), declining by 
24.1% and 9.6% respectively since 2001 (SNZ 2013). 
 Agricultural restructuring has particularly 
affected sheep farming, which was the mainstay of the 
South Island economy. The elimination of subsidies has 
encouraged the revival of a productivist agricultural 
economy and the replacement of sheep with higher value 
dairy. This is epitomized by the establishment of the giant 
Fonterra national cooperative in 2001, which accounts for 
 ? ?A?ŽĨEĞǁĞĂůĂŶĚ ?ƐƚŽƚĂůĞǆƉŽƌƚƐ ?ŵŽƐƚůǇƚŽŵĂƌŬĞƚƐŝŶ
Asia and Latin America (Fonterra 2016). Through the 
application of advanced technologies and rationalization 
of dairy processing, Fonterra has (re)developed New 
ĞĂůĂŶĚ ?ƐĚĂŝƌy industry into a global competitor. However, 
the outcome has meant considerable changes to the 
structure of the rural family, communities, land ownership, 
and the rural landscape in formerly sheep rearing regions. 
The removal of subsidies in the 1980s also 
coincided with demographic decline in sheep farming 
regions through the 1990s with, for example, Invercargill 
being the only urban area in New Zealand to shrink, by 5% 
between 1991 and 1996. Much of this was due to the 
downward economic pressures being felt by sheep 
farming families who were slow to adapt to the new 
national agricultural regime. However, outsiders have 
been attracted into regions where the conversion to dairy 
has been ongoing, and there have been economic benefits 
flowing into the new dairy industry; though land transfers 
and the wide variations in agricultural productivity have 
also contributed to wealth inequalities within some 
agricultural communities (Forney and Stock 2013). 
New Zealand has also seen dramatic growth in 
some rural and provincial communities. In addition to the 
expansion of dairy farming, in South Island both tourism 
and viticulture have been instrumental in an emerging 
new cultural economy where substantial symbolic value 
has been created by recasting remote and marginal 
regions into unspoiled and unpolluted areas of natural 
beauty (Photos 24-28) (Conradson and Pawson 2009). In 
Otago, Queenstown, Arrowtown and Wanaka have 
developed a tourism industry that benefits from each 
having a complementary identity, and which 
simultaneously benefit from and contribute to New 
ĞĂůĂŶĚ ?ƐŐƌŽǁŝŶŐŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌĂĚǀĞŶƚƵƌĞ
and extreme sports (Queenstown), heritage and cultural 
tourism (Arrowtown), and a spectacular and clean natural 
environment (Wanaka). Located less than 20km from each 
other they form an unlikely triangle of growth in a 
previously shrinking and remote inland area of South 
Island, with the population of Queenstown-Lakes District 
growing 65.6%, from 17,040 to 28,224 between 2001 and 
2013 (SNZ 2013). A former gold mining town, Arrowtown 
had declined to less than 200 people in the 1960s, before 
reviving itself through a carefully managed programme of 
preserving and renovating historic buildings and using its 
mining heritage in developing a significant cultural 
ecŽŶŽŵǇ ŝŶƚŚĞĂƌĞĂ ?ďŝŐƉĂƌƚŽĨƌƌŽǁƚŽǁŶ ?Ɛ ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ
has been in attracting Chinese tourists to visit the Chinese 
settlement there, to see how the original Chinese gold 
prospectors had lived and worked. In 2003 the 
settlement ?Ɛ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ was acknowledged by Prime 
Minister Helen Clark as important in developing New 
ĞĂůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶŝŶŐ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ǁŝƚŚ ŚŝŶĂ ďǇ
ĐŽŶĨŝƌŵŝŶŐ  ‘ƚŚĞ ƵŶŝƋƵĞ ŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ? ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ĂŶĚ ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚ ŽĨ
ƚŚĞŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůŚŝŶĞƐĞEĞǁĞĂůĂŶĚĞƌƐ ? ?17 
Alongside the conversion to dairy farming there 
has been a significant growth in viticulture that, in part, 
also emerged from the decline in sheep farming, but is 
ĂůƐŽĂƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĨƌĞĞƚƌĂĚĞƉŽůŝĐǇ ?/Ŷ
South Island, the areas around Cromwell and Alexandra in 
Otago, and further north in Marlborough and around 
Nelson, have received investments, including by actor Sam 
Neill, himself a New Zealand citizen, and each has 
experienced substantial growth in its population and 
economy. The wine indƵƐƚƌǇ ŚĂƐ ƵƐĞĚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ
reputation for a cleaner and gentler environment to 
create wines with a distinctively softer and lighter New 
ĞĂůĂŶĚ  ‘ďƌĂŶĚ ? ? EĞǁ ĞĂůĂŶĚ ŚĂƐ ůĂƚĞůǇ ĞŵĞƌŐĞĚ ĂƐ Ă
world leading producer of Sauvignon Blanc and Pinot Noir; 
and the result has been 21 consecutive years of increasing 
exports through to 2016, with a 10% increase to NZD1.6 
billion in 2015-16, mainly to Anglophone countries. An 
effective strategy has been to sell high quality wines 
domestically to international tourists to make wine an 
important part of their overall New Zealand experience, in 
the hope of creating lifelong wine ambassadors, 
particularly in new markets such as China (NZW 2016). 
Another interesting development has been the 
conversion in 2000 of parts of the former Otago Central 
Railway into an off-road cycling path, linking small and 
declining settlements that had been threatened with 
collapse after the railway shut down in 1990. The path 
ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐ Ă ƉŚǇƐŝĐĂů ŚĞƌŝƚĂŐĞ ůŝŶŬ ďĂĐŬ ƚŽ ^ŽƵƚŚ /ƐůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ
early development as a series of small and isolated 
agricultural communities, as well as attracting domestic 
and international tourists who come to enjoy the clean 
environment, spectacular scenery, and uncluttered traffic 
free routes. At 150km it usually requires a few days to 
complete, providing opportunities for cyclists to stop and 
enjoy life along the route. Contrary to original 
expectations, local impressions suggest that the largest 
groups of visitors appear to be middle-aged and older 
international visitors visiting New Zealand on longer trips 
and who are prepared to take more time, spend more on 
meals, accommodation, and equipment, thereby 
encouraging the development of a slow(er) economy that 
places importance on enhancing personal well-being and 
the quality of the human-environmental interface. 
 Finally, public art is being used extensively 
throughout provincial New Zealand as a local cultural and 
economic marker for both residents and visitors; to 
strengthen local identity and pride among the former, and 
transmit ideas, knowledge, and feelings about a place to 
the latter (Photos 29-33). These can be isolated private 
individual contributions, groups of residents, or more 
ambitious projects organized by corporations and local 
authorities. Three examples from South Island are briefly 
introduced below: 
x Bus stops and railway sheds along the main road 
and rail route between Dunedin and Port 
Chalmers have been decorated by a collaboration 
between residents and a local artist to evoke the 
local fauna as well as tell stories about local 
history. The route also benefits from a new scenic 
foot and cycle path that runs parallel to the 
railway along the bay-shore. 
x The gold mining company, Oceania Gold, at 
Macraes has paid for a large outdoor exhibition 
of conceptual art in the local village, including 
huge paintings, sculptures, and installations. 
x ƵŶĞĚŝŶ ?^ŽƵƚŚ /ƐůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ ƐĞĐŽŶĚ ůĂƌŐĞƐƚ ĐŝƚǇ ?ŚĂƐ
developed an international street art trail as part 
of its efforts to redevelop the run-down industrial 
zone near the historic railway station. Currently 
there are 28 giant outdoor wall paintings for 
visitors to explore.
Photos 24-28. (24) A middle-aged European couple take a break from cycling the Railtrail to visit the historic Chatto Creek Tavern in Otago; (25) The Railtrail makes its way through traditional 
sheep country near Omakau, Otago; (26) &ŽŶƚĞƌƌĂ ?ƐŵŝůŬƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŝŶŐĨĂĐŝůŝƚǇĂƚĚĞŶĚĂůĞ ?^ŽƵƚŚůĂŶĚ; (27) Vineyards line the south bank of the Kawarau River at Cromwell, Otago; (28) Chinese 
tourists throng the main street in Arrowtown, Otago. Click on highlighted text for Google Maps tools for these locations. 
 
   
 
 
Photos 29-33. (29) A decorated bus stop between Dunedin and Port Chalmers; (30) A café adorned with a red poppy in Port Chalmers; (31) A railway shed between Dunedin and Port 
Chalmers; (32) Giant paintings among cattle and sheep in Macraes; (33) Art from the Dunedin Street Art Trail (Note: Google Street Map image for this location was taken prior to the street 
art being painted). Click on highlighted text for Google Maps tools for these locations. 
 
  
 
 
 
Concluding Analysis: Towards an Asia-WĂĐŝĨŝĐ ?ĞƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶŝǀŝĚĞŶĚ ? 
 
Photos 34-36. Common tsunami risks in Japan and New Zealand. (34) A tsunami warning with aluminium smelting plant 
at sea level in the background near Bluff, Southland, New Zealand; (35 and 36) Tsunami destruction in 2011 at 
Rikuzentakata and Ishinomaki ?dƃŚŽŬƵ ?:ĂƉĂŶ ?ůŝĐŬŽŶŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚĞĚƚĞǆƚfor Google Maps tools for these locations. 
 
 
 
 
Since the 1990s Japan has been facing the end of its 
modern expansion and the emergence of a post-growth 
society and economy. China and South Korea also face 
ageing and depopulation, due to similar patterns of 
demographic and economic change. Later in the century 
other Asia-Pacific countries may follow. New Zealand as a 
whole is still growing steadily, though much of the 
ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐŐƌŽǁƚŚŝƐĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚŝŶĂƐŵĂůůŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨ
urban settlements, and early signs of a post-growth 
regime are emerging, with rural ageing and depopulation 
appearing in some provincial locales. 
 SignifiĐĂŶƚůǇ ? ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ďŽƚŚ ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ? ƌƵƌĂů
communities are responding to decline and shrinkage 
through innovations that root local agency in new value 
orientations, there are some significant differences. In 
Sado Island the inevitability of future shrinkage is 
prompting the community to prioritize a new localism, 
personal health and the environment, and lifestyle 
aesthetics. This approach does not represent a rejection 
of growth. Rather it is an acceptance that growth is no 
longer possible, even theoretically, and whose 
acknowledgement has driven a search for alternatives. 
^ŝŵŝůĂƌǀĂůƵĞƐĂƌĞĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐŝŶEĞǁĞĂůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ^ŽƵƚŚ/ƐůĂŶĚ ?
but producing different outcomes, most probably due to 
ƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ ?ƐĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚĐƵůƚƵƌĂůŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚǇĂŶĚĚĞŵŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐ
circumstances. 
 Unlike in Sado Island, for South Island New 
Zealanders growth remains a theoretical and practical 
expectation in nearly every community, even as Auckland 
continues to expand, because the country as a whole is 
still growing. Hence the re-emergence of a productivist 
agricultural sector with the replacement of sheep by dairy 
farming, and its growth into a major contributor to New 
ĞĂůĂŶĚ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƚƌĂĚĞďĂůĂŶĐĞ ?EŽƚĂďůĞ ?ŵŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ?
has been the recasting of remoteness and marginality as 
an economic advantage in response to deregulation, 
globalization, and rural change through the development 
of tourism and viticulture within a new cultural economy; 
a recasting that is yet to occur successfully across rural 
Japan ? dŚĞ ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ EĞǁ ĞĂůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ ŽǀĞƌĂůů
demographic expansion with comparatively higher rates 
of fertility and immigration will likely see these 
approaches maintained. However, at the subnational and 
sub-ƌĞŐŝŽŶĂů ůĞǀĞůƐEĞǁĞĂůĂŶĚ ?ƐŐƌŽǁƚŚŝƐƵŶďĂůĂŶĐĞĚ ?
and some shrinking communities are unlikely to 
experience growth in future no matter how hard they try; 
a situation that is reminiscent of peripheral rural 
communities in Japan before the national population 
stopped growing and passed over the threshold into 
depopulation in 2008. 
The Asia-Pacific area will remain economically 
dynamic. However, a deep cleavage is appearing there, 
between large, vibrant, energetic and relatively young 
metropolitan centres, such as Tokyo, Shanghai, Shenzhen, 
Seoul, and Auckland, and an ageing and depopulating 
provincial periphery. Not only is the number and size of 
marginal regional communities rising, their vulnerability 
to risks is increasing. Climate change theory predicts 
extreme weather events of increasing frequency and 
intensity, and the Western zone of the Pacific Ring of Fire 
appears to be experiencing an increase in seismic activity 
(Lay 2015), with deadly earthquakes occurring near 
Sumatra in 2004, and in New Zealand and Japan in early 
2011. The 11 March 2011 tsunami in Northeastern Japan 
in particular revealed how vulnerable ageing and 
depopulating communities can be to external shocks, and 
New Zealand faces similar risks along its eastern seaboard 
(McMillan 2013). As countries develop their economies 
there is an increasing risk of extreme disturbances 
destabilising industrial facilities such as power stations 
and chemical plants. Hence, large-scale techno-
ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂůƐŚŽĐŬƐƐƵĐŚĂƐŽĐĐƵƌƌĞĚŝŶdƃŚŽŬƵĂŶĚƚŚĞ
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant may in future 
strike ageing and shrinking regions elsewhere in the Asia-
Pacific. 
More research into how socio-economic and 
demographic transitions interact in the Asia-Pacific region 
is essential to provide knowledge for responding to similar 
circumstances worldwide in the decades to come. In 
particular, how developed countries such as Japan and 
New Zealand, with differing national developmental 
pathways but some similar subnational demographic 
patterns, respond to the intersection between the long 
time horizons of their emerging circumstances and the 
potential for sudden shocks in the external environment, 
will be especially instructive for other regions of the world 
as they traverse their own paths through ageing, 
shrinkage, and post-industrial development and seek a 
 ‘ĚĞƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶĚŝǀŝĚĞŶĚ ? ?
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